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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEVEN NORTON,
Appellant,
Case No. 20020708

v.
STATE OF UTAH,

Priority No. 2
Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the decision rendered by the Fourth District Court, Wasatch County
wherein the defendant was convicted of DUI a Third Degree on August 28, 2002, and the Court
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on January 3, 2003. This Court has jurisdiction
to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-508(8) (1953 as amended).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a criminal conviction is a review of the trial court's factual findings
for clear error and its conclusions of law for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,935-936 (Utah
1994). "When it comes to reviewing trial court determinations of law, however, the standard of
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review is not phrased as 'clearly erroneous.5 Rather, appellate review of a trial court's determination
of the law is usually characterized by the term 'correctness.' Controlling Utah case law teaches that
'correctness5 means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree
to the trialjudge's determination of law. State v. Dell 861 P.2d431,433 (Utah 1993); see Kennecott
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'a 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993). "This is because appellate courts
have traditionally been seen as having the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that
it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of
Appellate Courts, 41 Minn.L.Rev. 751, 779 (1957); see State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1256, 1266
(Utah 1993).

RELEVANT FACTS
On April 30, 2001 the Legislature made an amendment to Utah Code 41-6-44 6(a)(i), which
in effect raised the charge for a DUI from a Class B Misdemeanor to a Third Degree Felony, when
the person convicted of the DUI had "a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten
years of two or more prior convictions." Before this amendment the language of the code was the
same except the time limitation imposed was six years instead often.
On July 28, 1992, Appellant, Norton, was convicted of DUI. Again in 1996 appellant,
Norton, was convicted of DUI. When Norton was arrested in 2002 for DUI he was charged under
the amended statute, instead of the previous statute and was convicted of a third degree felony.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The law in Utah until April 30, 2001, was that if a person had three or more DUI convictions
within six years the third conviction could be raised from a class B misdemeanor to a third degree
felony Appellant was convicted of DUI July 28, 1992, and in 1996 In the year 1998 six years had
passed since appellant's first conviction and under the law he no longer fell under the category of
Utah Code 41-6-44 6(a)(i) This meant that his conviction in 1992 could no longer be used against
him to raise any new DUI conviction from a misdemeanor to a felony Under the law this prior
conviction was no longer valid as a means of augmenting any new convictions
Pursuant to the amendment made to the statute in 2001 the conviction of the Appellant in
1992 was used when he was convicted in 2002 thus enhancing the DUI to a third degree felony
Thus in the year 1998 when 6 years had passed since his first conviction, the Appellant was still held
under the amended 2001 statute even though the time has lapsed for the enhancement. In essence
the Statute of Limitations had run on this 1992 conviction and for all intents and purposes this
conviction could never be used against him This is so even though in 2001 when the Legislature
adopted a new amendment to the statute changing the time limitation from 6 years to 10 years.
Appellant argues that the Court misinterpreted the statute and should have found that any conviction
which occurred less than 6 years prior to the amended UCA §41-6-44 6(a)(i)

ARGUMENT
L

APPELLANT'S CONVICTION IN 1992 SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
IN THE NEW STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE 41-6-44 6(a)(1)
BECAUSE THE 6 YEAR PERIOD HAD ALREADY RUN.

When interpreting new statutes the primary goal of the Court should be to "evince true
intent and purpose of the Legislature " State v McKinnon. 51 P 3d 729, 731 (Utah 2002) In
order to discern the Legislature's intent and purpose, the Court should look first to the cbest
evidence' of a statute's meaning, or the plain language of the act State v Tooele County, 44
P 3d 680 (Utah 2002) The Court is permitted to look beyond the statute's plain language if the
language is found to be ambiguous See State v McKinnon. 51 P 3d 729, 731 (Utah 2002) The
language of Utah Code 41-6-44 6(a)(i) does not specify if all convictions within ten years should
be included in the analysis and is silent as to those convictions where the statute of limitations has
run under the previous language of the amended code
"We hold that a statutory amendment enlarging a statute of limitations will extend the
limitations period applicable to a crime already committed only if the amendment becomes
effective before the previously applicable statute of limitations has run, thereby barring
prosecution of the crime In other words, no subsequent amendment of the statute that enlarges a
limitations period can resurrect the State's ability to prosecute a crime already barred because of
the running of the statute of limitations " State v Lusk, 37 P 3d 1103, 1109 (Utah 2001)
"It is a long-standing rule of statutory construction that a legislative enactment which
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alters the substantive law or affects vested rights will not be read to operate retrospectively unless
the legislature has clearly expressed that intention." Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253
(Utah 1988); accord Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435,
437 (Utah 1997); Roark v. Crabtree. 893 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1995).
The supreme courts's decision in State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146 (Utah 1989), addresses
the requirements for the use of prior convictions for enhancement purposes. "Although Triptow
deals with the use of prior offenses to designate the defendant as a habitual criminal, the reasoning
is applicable" to DUI cases. Id. at 146. See also State v. Pooler, 2002 WL 31085087 (Utah App.
2002).
The Court said in Del Monte Corp. v. Moore, 580 P.2d 224, 225 (Utah 1978) that "the
general and well-established principle of law is that statutes prescribing limitations relate to
remedies; and that the legislature has power to increase the time in which an action may be
brought. In that connection it should be observed that if the statute has run on a cause of action,
so that it is dead, it cannot be revived by any such statutory extension. But if the cause of action
is still alive, the new enactment can extend the time in which it may be brought " Commenting on
thsi decision the Court said in State v. Lusk, 37 P.3d 1103, 1109 (Utah 2001) that "we believe
that this language from Del Monte regarding civil actions similarly applies to criminal
prosecutions."
"Hence, we hold that once the statute of limitations has run on a crime committed,
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precluding prosecution of the crime, it is forever barred and a defendant's vested right to rely on
that limitations defense cannot be eliminated by subsequent legislative action." State v. Lusk. 37
P.3d 1103 (Utah 2001).

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Appellant asks the Court to reverse his felony conviction and find
that the 1994 DUI conviction does not apply under the amended rule of Utah Code Ann. § 41-644(6)(a)(i) (1953 as amended). Appellant asks the Court to thus hold that the language of Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (1953 as amended) is ambiguous and therefore does not support his
felony conviction under said statute.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^Kday of _ \
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, 2003

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I hand delivered or mailed the foregoing postage prepaid to J. FREDERIC
VOROS JR., Asst. Attorney General 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor. P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake
City, UT 84114-0854
DATED this _^>

day of February , 2003.

Addendum
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*1
DEREKP.PULLAN #6633
Wasatch County Attorney
THOMAS L. LOW #6601
Deputy County Attorney
805 West 100 South
Heber City, Utah 84032
Telephone: (435) 654-2909
Facsimile: (435) 654-2947

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
>
Plaintiff,

vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
ENHANCEMENT

STEVEN NORTON,
Case No. 011500206
Judge Donald J. Eyre

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on July 17,2002, on Defendant's
motion to dismiss the enhancement of his charge. Defendant was present and represented by
counsel, Dana Facemyer. Plaintiff was represented by Thomas Low. The Court, having heard
the stipulations of counsel, received evidence, and heard argument and, being fully advised in the
premises, makes and enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order:

1

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant was arrested on November 23, 2001, for Driving Under the Influence,
in violation of Utah Code Section 41-6-44. His charge was filed as a felony DUI
due to his two previous DUI convictions during the ten years previous to
November 23,2001.

2.

The first of Defendant's relevant prior convictions, entered on July 28,1992,
contains a record from the Heber City Justice Court in which the Justice Court
judge affirmed that Defendant was advised of "all applicable enhancements/'
Defendant also signed a "Notification of Enhancement" in that Court in which he
acknowledged that he understood "than any future conviction on the same offense
will result in enhanced penalties, which penalties have been explained to me/'
This record also reflects that Defendant was represented on the case by an
attorney, J, Bruce Savage.

3.

The second of Defendant's relevant prior convictions, entered on April 4,1996,
contains a record from the Summit County Justice Court indicating that
Defendant's guilty plea was entered "freely and voluntarily with knowledge of the
consequences.'1 The record also reflects that Defendant was represented by an
attorney on the case, J. Bruce Savage. There is no record that Defendant signed a
Notification of Enhancement form as he had in the 1992 Heber City case,

2

4

His DUI arrest on November 23^2001, was within ten years of the 1992 and 1996
DUI convictions.

5.

Defendant has at no time attempted to appeal or collaterally attack his 1992 or
1996 convictions. Consequently, both convictions remain valid at the present
time.

6.

At the time of Defendant* s prior DUI convictions, the relevant ttme"period for
considering prior DUI convictions for enhancement purposes was six years.
Effective April 30, 2001, the relevant time period was changed to ten years. See
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (History). This modification of Utah law occurred
prior to Defendant's arrest for DUI on November 23, 200L
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Rule 9-301 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires justice court
judges receiving guilty pleas to a crime subject to enhanced penalties in the event
of a repeated conviction in the future to "[ajdvise the defendant, orally and in
writing o f , , . the enhancement penalty which may be imposed in the event the
defendant is convicted of the same offense in the future/* The only consequences
set forth for failure to follow this requirement are set forth in Utah Code of
Judicial Administration 2-211, relating to internal discipline of judges.
Invalidation of a criminal conviction is not provided by Utah law as a

3

consequence of the failure of a justice court judge to strictly follow Rule 9-301,
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the entry of guilty pleas.
This Rule does not require a Defendant to be advised of enhancement possibilities
resulting from future convictions for the same offense. Indeed, the last paragraph
of Rule 11(e) states, "Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a
plea." Consequently, the failure to advise a Defendant of such collateral
consequences "does not affect the validity of a plea/* Advisory Committee Note
to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 1L The possibility that a criminal offense
may be enhanced in severity if the crime is repeated in the future is just such a
"collateral consequence,"
The legislature is within its authority to modify penalties for criminal conduct.
State v. Coleman. 540 P.2d 953 (Utah 1975).
Defendant was not penalized by the legislature's amendment of Utah Code
Section 41-6-44 at the time that the amendment was effectuated, on April 30,
2001.
Defendant's only penalties will come in the event he is convicted of a violation of
the recently amended section 41-6-44, which violation is alleged to have occurred
on November 23, 2001, well after the amendment date.
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Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court now hereby
makes and enters the following Order.
ORDER
Defendant's motion to dismiss the enhancement of his offense from a third degree felony
to a class B misdemeanor is dehied.
DATED this

Q>

day of January, 2002.

You are hereby notified that the above Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Enhancement will be forwarded to the Court for
signature eight daysfromthe date that it was mailed to you unless you notify counsel for Plaintiff
that you object to its form.

THOMAS L. LOW, Attorney for Plaintiff
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